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LEGALITY IN THE SECOND CmCUIT
Steven B. Duke*
In his highly regarded treatise, The Limits of the Criminal
Sanction, the late Professor Herbert Packer reminded us that
"[t]he :first principle [of criminal law] is that conduct may not
be treated as criminal unless it has been so defined by an au-
thority having the institutional competence to do so before it
has taken place."l This is the principle of legality. According to
Professor Packer, there is "all-but-universal compliance with it
... in this country."2 Apart from prohibitions against retroac-
tivity, the two doctrines by which "the courts keep the principle
of legality in good repair"3 are the void-for-vagueness doctrine
and the doctrine requiring strict construction of penal statutes.
Each is a contiguous segment of the same spectrum.4
The doctrine of strict construction, also known as the rule
of lenity, is deeply rooted in the common law, "perhaps not
much less old than construction itself."1i The void-for-vagueness
doctrine, apparently of more recent origin,6 was nonetheless a
sturdy seedling at the turn of the century:: Both doctrines re-
cently have received approving references in the Supreme
Court.8 In the Second Circuit, however, both doctrines are dead.
* Law of Science and Technology Professor, Yale Law SchooL




• United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 76, 95 (1820).
8 H.L. PACKER, supra note 1, at 93.
"I See, e.g., United States v. Brewer, 139 U.s. 278 (1891); Aigler, Legislation in
Vague or General Terms, 21 :MICH. L. REv. 831 (1923).
8 Williams v. United States, 102 S. Ct. 3088, 3095 (1982) (rule of lenity); Bifulco v.
United States, 447 U.S. 381 (1980) (same); Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.s. 104 (1972)
(void-for-vagueness); Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971) (rule of lenity).
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HeinOnline -- 49 Brook. L. Rev.  912 1982-1983
912 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49: 911
Several cases decided during the 1981-1982 term of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit illustrate the
court's treatment of these time honored principles. It is my the-
sis that at least one of these doctrines - the rule of lenity -
has not recieved a proper burial.
I. THE VALUES SERVED BY THE VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS AND RULE
OF LENITY DOCTRINES
The values served by the void-for-vagueness doctrine and
the rule of lenity are the same. A cluster of values, typically
treated under the rubric of the requirement of "fair notice," are
intimately related to the purposes and justifications of criminal
punishment. Whatever other purposes or objectives we may seek
in criminal punishment, e.g., deterrence, reformation, incapaci-
tation, there is fundamental agreement that the harshest of soci-
ety's sanctions - criminal punishment - can justly be visited
only upon those who are morally and legally culpable. Included
in the concept of culpability is the assumption of choice or free
will:9 we can justly punish someone only if he or she had a fair
opportunity to choose to obey or to disobey the penal law.IO
That fair opportunity requires that the rule one is charged with
violating clearly proscribed the conduct at the time it was en-
gaged in. It is, of course, not necessary that the actor have
known of the rule or that he have correctly construed it; it is
necessary that he have been given the fair opportunity to have
done so. .
The second, quite distinct, set of values served by the doc-
trines are those values that underlie the separation of powers. It
is quintessentially only for the legislature to determine what
conduct shall be punished as criminal. Whatever may be said for
delegation of powers in other contexts, delegation of the power
to define criminal conduct to a body other than the legislature
threatens the basic structure of the tripartite system and is fun-
damentally undemocratic. Third are the values implicit in the
marginal conduct itself. Conduct that is neither clearly criminal
nor clearly noncriminal, i.e., that which is in the zone of uncer-
9 Whether "free will" is philosophically, psychologically, or empirically valid is all
but irrelevant to the criminal law, the postulates of which require the assumption of freo
will regardless of its validity. See H.L. PACKER, supra note I, at 74, 132.
10 [d. at 73-87.
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tainty, may be deterred or "chilled" by the uncertainty.ll To the
extent that such conduct is socially desirable or even constitu-
tionally protected, vague or ambiguous criminal prohibitions will
infringe upon or defeat the values served by the dissuaded
conduct.
Void-for-vagueness and the rule of lenity obviously have
overlapping functions. If a vague or ambiguous statute is de-
clared void-for-vagueness, there is no need to resort to the rule
of lenity. However, if strict construction can clarify and thus
avoid the ambiguity, the statute can be saved and the principle
of legality preserved. In short, for most purposes, either doc-
trine will perform the necessary function and render the other
redundant.12 It is only when both are disregarded that the prin-
ciple of legality becomes a fiction.
II. THE VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS DOCTRINE
Although the Supreme Court has repeatedly asserted that
"a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in
terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessa-
rily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates
the first essential of due process of law,U13 it has rarely, in recent
years, applied that principle to declare a statute void. Subsidi-
ary, limiting doctrines have been developed that have virtually
engulfed the rule. Thus, it is said that one whose conduct is
clearly prohibited by the statute cannot complain that the appli-
cation of the statute to other conduct might be unclear.14 More
11 See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.s. 601 (l973); Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.s.
104, 109 (1972).
n An important qualification, however, is that a vague statute violates the due pro-
cess clause whereas the rule of lenity is said to be merely a rule of construction. Thus,
federal courts cannot impose the rule of lenity on the states, many of which have abol-
ished it. W. LA FAVE & A. SCOTT, CRlMINAL LAw 72 (l972). It cannot be doubted, how-
ever, that the "fair notice" requirement is constitutional doctrine and that the states are
required to respect it, whether they do so by virtue of prohibitions on vagueness or strict
construction. It is therefore illogical to assume that the states are wholly free to abolish
strict construction. They can do so only if a functional substitute exists. Ct. United
States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (policies served by rule of lenity, virtually identi-
cal"to those underlying void-for-vagueness doctrine).
13 Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (l926). Accord Lanzetta v.
New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939)•
.. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 755 (1974); United States v. Raines, 362 U.s. 17, 21
(1960). Ct. United States v. National Dairy Prod. Corp., 372 U.s. 29, 32 (l963) ("statutes
are not automatically invalidated as vague simply because difficulty is found in deter-
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recently, some Justices of the Supreme Court have invented the
notion that the void-for-vagueness doctrine has no application to
a statute that has some core meaning; it applies only to a statute
that has no clear meaning at all. III If there is any conduct that is
clearly proscribed by the "core" of the statute, it is not void-for-
vagueness.IS Now that these notions have acquired ascendancy,
there is little to which the doctrine can attach, and decisions
striking down statutes on vagueness grounds are limited to iso-
lated abberations in which the Court clearly dislikes the statute
or it impinges upon or "chills" first amendment rights.17
The Second Circuit correctly analyzed the recent Supreme
Court decisions in Brache v. County of Westchester,I8 in which
plaintiff store owners sought to enjoin enforcement of a drug
paraphernalia ordinance. The plaintiffs complained that the or-
dinance, which made it a misdemeanor to sell or to display
"drug paraphernalia," defined as any materials "used, intended
for use, or desi[gn]ed for use in ... growing ... preparing, test-
ing ... [or] ingesting ... a controlled substance"19 was uncon-
stitutionally vague. They admitted that some of the items they
had for sale were plainly "drug paraphernalia" within the ordi-
nance,20 but complained that they had many multi-use items as
to which they could not know whether the ordinance was appli-
cable.21 The district court found the ordinance impermissibly
mining whether certain marginal offenses fall within their language"}. Contra Grayned v.
City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114 (1972) (where statute covers constitutionally pro-
tected activities).
1. United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92-95 (1975); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733,
755 (1974); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 578 (1974); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402
U.S. 611, 614 (1971).
18 United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92-95 (1975). It is another matter, of course,
if the statute infringes first amendment rights. For other limitations on the doctrine, see
note 112 and accompanying text infra.
17 See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972); Interstate Cir-
cuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507
(1948). For an interesting application of void-for-vagueness on the state level, see State
v. Young, 62 Ohio St. 2d 370 (1980) (invalidating statute proscribing "engaging in organ-
ized crime").
18 658 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1643 (1982).
18 Id. at 49 (quoting WESTCHESTER Co., N.Y., ORDINANCES § 863.22 (1980».
20 658 F.2d at 49. Plaintiffs conceded that such items as "marijuana test kits," "free
base cocaine kits" and "coke kits" had no realistic use other than to "ingest controlled
substances." Id. at 49 n.4. These items were characterized as single use items in both the
district court and court of appeals decisions in Brache.
21 Id. at 49-50.
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vague and enjoined its enforcement.22
The Second Circuit reversed. Speaking through Judge New-
man, the court found that the plaintiffs' "facial attack" on the
ordinance necessarily failed when the district court concluded
that certain single-use items were clearly within the "core"
meaning of the ordinance.23 Reiterating that "[one] to whom a
statute may validly be applied [cannot complain] that the stat-
ute would be unconstitutional [if] applied to other persons or
other situations,"24 the court held the ordinance valid and en-
forceable as applied to the plaintiffs' sale of these items.211 Re-
garding the plaintiffs' sale of multi-use items, the court held that
the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the ordinance's appli-
cation in the context of a pre-enforcement complaint.20
Asserted as a defense to a criminal conviction, the vague-
ness doctrine has repeatedly failed in the Second Circuit.27 In-
deed, I am not aware of its ever having succeeded. In any event,
the doctrine is at least as dead in the Second Circuit as it is in
the Supreme Court.
At the height of its respectability, the void-for-vagueness
doctrine was honored more in its breach than its observance.
Herculean, but largely unsuccessful efforts have been made to
square the doctrine with the decisions purporting to apply it.28
22 After conceding that plaintiffs had demonstrated a genuine threat of prosecution
to satisfy article ill requirements, the district court proceeded to conduct what it de-
scribed as a "facial analysis" of the statute. Brache v. County of Westhchester, 507 F.
Supp. 566, 574 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Although the court found that the statute clearly pro-
vided notice of its application to plaintiff's sale of certain single-use items, id. at 573, it
concluded that because the ordinance provided an inadequate basis for either a retailer
or a law enforcer to determine which multi-use items fell within its enforcement, the
statute was unconstitutionally vague on its face. ld. at 574-81.
23 658 F.2d at 51-52.
2< ld. at 51.
25 ld. at 51-52.
28 ld. at 52-54. In Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455
U.S. 489 (1982), decided several months after Brache, the Supreme Court rejected a sim-
ilar attack on a "head shop" ordinance. The Court's decision was consistent with the
Second Circuit's treatment in Brache.
2"1 See, e.g., United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v.
Persky, 520 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1975). See also United States v. Sperling, 506 F.2d 1323
(2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Sisca, 503 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v.
Manfredi, 488 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Schwart2, 464 F.2d 499 (2d Cir.
1972); United States v. Deutsch, 451 F.2d 98 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.s. 1019
(1972); United States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069 (2d Cir. 1969).
28 See generally W. LAFAVE AND A. SCOtT, supra note 12, at 83-89. See Amsterdam,
The Void-far-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960);
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The trouble is that most statutes are vague at their margins and
the consistent application of a rule that a vague criminal statute
is void would invalidate most existing statutes and give us crimi-
nal codes three or four feet thick. One cure for vagueness -
overcriminalization - is worse than the evil it replaces. Most
vagueness problems can be eliminated if the legislature is willing
to specify that virtually everything is criminal. Thus, instead of
prohibiting "loitering," the legislature can prohibit "appearing
on a public street or sidewalk unassisted by a vehicle." Pedestri-
anism, in short. Such a definition could catch most loiterers and
police discretion could be relied upon not to enforce the statute
against "us." Such statutes contain all the evils of a vague stat-
ute - they provide no real notice because they literally pro-
scribe common, "innocent" conduct and essentially delegate the
definitional process to the police - yet are all but impossible to
invalidate.29
ill. THE RULE OF LENITY
The purposes of the rule of lenity, despite its name, is not
to be lenient with criminals, but to preserve the principle of Ie..
gality, i.e., to provide fair notice and to assure that the decision
to criminalize is made by the legislature.3o There are various ver-
sions of the rule but essentially they come down to this: if the
application of the statute to the conduct in question is fairly de-
batable, if informed people "of common intelligence" can "differ
as to its application" to the conduct in question, then the issue
should be resolved against coverage.31 In short, borrowing the
Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV.
591, 660 (1981).
•• Occasionally, courts strike down statutes on vagueness grounds when the princi-
pal evil seems not to be vagueness but overreaching - criminalization of conduct that
was patently not "intended" to be punished. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jackson-
ville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972). There is an obvious need for a concept that would limit the
ability of legislatures to abdicate their responsibilities by overcriminalization, but no one
has yet worked out the criteria for determining when the legislature has not really in-
tended what it said. Moreover, the doctrine which permits invalidation of a statute that
literally proscribes "innocent" but not constitutionally protected conduct is extremely
fuzzy. See id.; People v. Berek, 32 N.Y.2d 567, 347 N.Y.S.2d 33, 400 N.E.2d 411 (1973).
My example in the text would, of course, have constitutional problems since much pe-
destrianism may be a matter of constitutional right.
3. See notes 9-11 and accompanying text supra.
31 "[W]hen choice has to be made between two readings of what conduct Congress
has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to requiro
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language of void-for-vagueness, the "core meaning" of the stat-
ute must apply to the conduct; if the conduct is on the periphery
of that meaning, criminal punishment should not be permitted,
as it is unclear both to the citizenry and to the court that the
legislative body intended to punish the conduct. Herein are
three cases - not meant to be an exhaustive count - in which
the rule, if it is a rule, should have been applied in the Second
Circuit last term.
In United States v. Newman,32 the defendant was indicted
for securities fraud, mail fraud, and conspiracy to commit such
frauds.33 The charges were based upon the claim that two em-
ployees of investment bankers divulged to Newman the fact that
certain companies were takeover candidates of the investment
bankers' corporate clients.34 Newman and some foreign associ-
ates then bought stock in the target companies and sold at a
profit when the takeovers became public knowledge.3G District
Judge Haight dismissed the indictment.36 With respect to the
securities fraud claim, Judge Haight held that the words of the
applicable statute, the regulations, and court decisions issued
prior to the conduct, singly or together, did not provide a "clear
and definite statement" that the conduct of Newman, or the em-
ployees of the investment bankers, constituted violations of the
securities laws.37 He applied the rule of lenity.
The statute involved, section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
hange Act of 1934,38 proscribes the use of "any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance" in violation of the Security Ex-
change Commission (SEC) rules, if "in connection with the
that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite." United States
v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971). See also WillillIIl3 v. United States, 102 S. Ct. 3088,
3095 (1982) (same); Rewis v. United States, 401 U.s. 80s, 812 (1971) ("ambiguity con-
cerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity"); United
States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476, 485 (1917) ("before a man can be punished 113 0. crimi-
nal • • • his case must be 'plainly and unmistakably' within the province of some
statute").
u 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
S3 Id. at 14.
MId. at 15.
lIS Id.
sa United States v. Courtois, (1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 'II
98,024, at 91,296 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 1981), reu'd sub. nom. United States v. Newman, 664
F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
37 Id. at 91,296.
sa 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
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purchase or sale of any security."39 Rule lOb-5 of the Commis-
sion's Rules prohibits use of "any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud" or any act or practice which would "operate as a fraud
or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security."40
Judge Haight found several obstacles to applying the stat-
ute or rule lOb-5 to Newman's conduct. The language is, of
course, ambiguous on the point. Moreover, the Supreme Court,
in Chiarella v. United States,41 had repently reversed the con-
viction of one who profited from nonpublic information. Chiarel-
la, like Newman, had acquired nonpublic information about
takeover plans, bought the stock of the target companies, and
profited therefrom. Chiarella had obtained his information as an
employee of a financial printer, who printed announcements of
takeover bids.42 The government had convicted him of violating
section lO(b) on the theory that when he purchased the stock in
the target companies he had an obligation to inform the sellers
of the stock about the forthcoming takeover bid, and that in
buying the stock without disclosing this information, he had
committed a fraud under section lO(b) and rule lOb-5.4s The Su-
preme Court acknowledged that such a disclosure obligation was
imposed on a corporate insider to the shareholders of his corpo-
ration, as they provided him the opportunity to acquire the in-
formation, in a relationship of trust and confidence."4 In the case
before it, however, the Court declared that:
No duty could arise from [Chiarella's] relationship with the seller's or
the target company's securities, for [he] had no prior dealing with
them. He was not their agent, he was not a fiduciary, he was not a
person in whom the sellers had placed their trust and confidence. He
was, in fact, a complete stranger who dealt with the sellers only
through impersonal market transactions.
We cannot affirm [his] conviction without recognizing a general
duty between all participants in market transactions to forego actions
based on material, nonpublic information. . • . That should not be
•• ld.
'0 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981)•
.. 445 U.S. 222 (1980)•
•• ld. at 224•
•• ld. at 231. The case was also apparently tried on the theQI'Y that Chiarella had II
duty to "the market as a whole." ld.
u ld. at 227.
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undertaken absent some explicit evidence of Congressional intent.'''11
The government advanced an alternative theory in Chiarel-
la: as an employee of the printer, who was hired by the acquir-
ing corporation, Chiarella had a fiduciary duty to the latter,
which he had violated.46 The Court declined to decide "whether
this theory has merit" as the case had not been tried on such a
theory.47
In Newman, the government sought to escape Chiarella
with the theory left open there. It argued that Newman's co-
horts, as employees of the investment bankers who were given
confidential information by the acquiring corporations, violated
a fiduciary duty in profiting from the nonpublic information
about the takeover plans, and that Newman, as their co-conspir-
ator, also violated their duty.48 In evaluating the government's
new theory in Newman, Judge Haight accepted without quibble
the mildly debatable claim that Newman, although not a fiduci-
ary himself, nonetheless violated a fiduciary obligation of others
by acting in concert with them.49 He was thus willing to treat
Newman as the counterpart of Chiarella/SO However, he still
concluded that the charge could not stand;:I1 Judge Haight de-
termined that Newman had profited in transactions concerning
the stock of the target companies on infomation acquired else-
where, i.e., from the acquiring companies, mid that he had no
fiduciary duty to the sellers of the stock he acquired, or to the
target companies themselves.li2
.0 Id. at 232-33.
•• Id. at 235.
'7 Id. at 236.




01 Id. at 91,291.
o. Id. Judge Haight described Newman as a "peripheral figure" privy to information
from outside the target company. Id. Judge Haight also noted that there W!13 another
practice involving corporate takeovers and nonpublic information that had bothered the
SEC, i.e., where an acquiring company itself leaks information about a pending takeover
to obtain help in its cause. The SEC had concluded that rule lOb·5 did not apply to that
situation because the disclosers and users of the nonpublic information have no fiduciary
relationship to the target company. Thus, although the Commission thought the prac-
tice, called "warehousing," was problematic, it was not prohibited by the letter or pur-
pose of rule 10b-5. Id. at 91,292-94. The Supreme Court also noted this inconsistency in
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 245-35. The Second Circuit had suggested, moreover, that rule
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Judge Haight also noted that with respect to the specific
misconduct involved in Newman, the SEC itself had recognized
that it was probably not covered by rule 10b-5, and had thus
promulgated a rule specifically outlawing the conduct in 1980,
"several years after the acts alleged in the indictment."lls Judge
Haight also failed to find anything in the case law supporting
the government's theory. There were simply no cases, civil or
criminal, holding that such conduct was a violation of rule 10b-5
at the time the acts took place.G4 He concluded that, as of 1978,
when the last acts alleged in the indictment occurred, "neither
courts, commentators, nor the SEC . . . had stated that Rule
10b-5 extended to a noninsider's breach of a fiduciary duty owed
to the acquiring corporation in a tender offer. . . [T]he indica-
tions ... were quite to the contrary."GIl
The Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Van Graafei-
land, reversed.GO Judge Van Graafeiland noted that several court
decisions had applied rule 10b-5 to situations in which neither a
purchaser nor a seller of securities was defrauded concerning the
value of the stock, e.g., where a broker absconds with a cus-
tomer's money.1l7 He then concluded that Newman and his co-
horts had defrauded the investment bankers by "sullying [their]
reputations."llo They also had "wronged" the acquiring corpora-
tions, by using the information to buy shares in the target com-
panies, thus possibly driving up the price and making the acqui-
sition more difficult.1l9 Judge Van Graafeiland reasoned that
deceitful misappropriation of confidential information by a
fiduciary is, in "other areas of the law," unlawful, and Congress
surely did not intend "to establish a less rigorous code of con-
10b-5 did not prohibit warehousing. General Tire Corp. v. Talley Indus. Inc., 403 F.2d
159, 164-65 (2d Cir. 1968).
63 [1981 Transfer Binder] FEn. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 11 98,024, at 91,292. The rule
which prohibited Newman's conduct was not enacted pursuant to rule 10(b), but rather
under different legislation authorizing rulemaking concerning tender offers. Rule 140-3,
17 C.F.R. § 240 (1981).
G4 [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 11 98,024, at 91,295.
66 Id. at 91,296.
G6 Newman, 664 F.2d at 14.
67 Id. at 17. Judge Haight had also recognized an exception to the general rule re-
quiring that the fraud be related to the company or at least to the market for the shares:
those situations in which the securities themselves or the proceeds therefrom were mis-
appropriated. [1981 Transfer Binder] FEn. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 11 98,024, at 91,295.
69 664 F.2d at 17.
6. Id. at 17-18.
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duct under the Securities Acts."60 As to the defendant's argu-
ment that the fraud did not have the requisite "connection with
the purchase or sale of securities," Judge Van Graafeiland noted
that the Supreme Court had said, long before Newman, that this
phrase included fraud "touching" the sale of securities,ol and
that Newman had bought and sold securities.02 Judge Van
Graafeiland asserted that the language of rule lOb-5 itself pro-
vided "clear notice to appellee that his fraudulent conduct was
unlawful."63
Notably missing from the Second Circuit's analysis was any
reference to the SEC's own interpretations of rule lOb-5, which
supported the district court's decision. Also absent was reference
to any court decision, other than its own Chiarella opinion that
had been reversed by the Supreme Court,fU holding that the use
of nonpublic information in the trading of stock by one who was
not a corporate insider or "tippee" violated rule lO(b). Since the
Second Circuit was bound by Chiarella's holding that no duty
was owed to the sellers of the stock, the court seemingly held
that any breach of trust or fraud which is motivated by or as-
sists the purchase or sale of stock is a violation of section lO(b).
Thus, under this reasoning, a person who steals money with
which to buy securities has apparently committed a fraud "in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities."G6 A burglar
who converts his loot to cash, looks for a place to invest it, and
then buys securities, may also have violated section lO(b). In any
event, the Second Circuit all but embraced the doctrine which
the Supreme Court rejected in Chiarella, that anyone who
trades securities on nonpublic information violates rule lO(b).
&0 Id. at 18.
81 Id. The case cited, Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & CasUlllty Co.,
404 U.S. 6 (1971), involved a scheme by which all the stock of a corporation wns EOld and
the assets of the company used to pay for the stock. Included in the Echeme wns n sale of
bonds by the company. The Court thought that the fraud in connection with the sale of
bonds (the corporation was duped into believing that it, and not an outsider, would re-
ceive the proceeds) was a violation of section 10(b).
82 "[S]ince appellee's sole purpose in participating in the misappropriLltion of confi·
dential takeover information was to purchase shares of the target companies, we find
little merit in his disavowal of a connection between the fraud and the purclwse.» 664
F.2d at 18.
u Id. at 19.
M United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978), reu'd, 445 U.s. 222
(1980).
8. See 664 F.2d at 18; note 62 supra.
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The only way to acquire such information is, directly or indi-
rectly, by breach of a fiduciary relationship. It is also difficult, if
not impossible, to imagine a case in which one who trades on
such information is not hurting, taking advantage of, or "sully-
ing" someone.66
My point is not that Newman is bad securities law.o7 As
Judge Haight noted, what Newman and his cohorts did is now
clearly unlawful.68 To suggest that it was clearly a violation of
section 10(b) in 1978, however, borders on the preposterous.
In United States v. Angelilli,69 the Second Circuit was faced
with a novel interpretation of the Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organizations Act of 1970 (RICO).70 The defendants were
New York City Marshals, officers of the city's Civil Court, who
were in charge of levying on the property of judgment debtors,
selling it at public auction, and remitting the proceeds to judg-
ment creditors. They carried out a scheme among themselves,
some auctioneers, and some buyers, to engage in a rigged auction
whereby the property would be sold at a previously agreed upon
price, apparently well below market value.71 Thereafter, a sec-
ond private auction would be held wherein the same buyers seri-
ously bid for the property. The difference between the price paid
in the public auction and that paid in the private auction then
would be distributed to the marshals and the buyers.72 The
judgment creditor would receive only the proceeds from the
rigged auction.
Among other charges, the defendants were tried and con-
•• It is also difficult to see how an acquiring corporation can avoid a section 10(b)
violation if it acquires nonpublic information about the target company before buying
the latter's securities. But see General Tire Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 403 F.2d 159 (2d
Cir. 1968).
.. District Judge Dumbauld dissented from the panel decision because he was "not
certain" that Newman's fraud was "in connection with the purchase or sale of any sccur-
ity." 664 F.2d at 20. The panel also reversed Judge Haight's holding that the conduct
was not mail fraud, and Judge Dumbauld concurred in that decision. Id. at 20-21. For
another discussion of Newman in this issue, see Poser, Misuse of Confidential Informa-
tion Concerning a Tender Offer as a Securities Fraud, 49 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1265
(1983)•
.. [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 11 98,024, at 91,296.
sa 660 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1981).
,. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976).
11 660 F.2d at 26•
.. Id.
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victed of violations of RICO and of conspiring to violate RICO.'l3
The theory of the prosecution under RICO was that the defen-
dants had conspired to engage and did engage in a "pattern of
racketeering activity" (mail fraud and extortion) "in the conduct
of the affairs" of an "enterprise" engaged in interstate or foreign
commerce.'l4 The "enterprise" in which the defendants engaged
was the New York City Civil Court.'llS
On appeal, the defendants claimed that the City Court was
not an "enterprise" within the meaning of RICO. Judge Kearse,
joined by Judge Mansfield, disagreed.'l6 Judge Kearse disposed
of the defendants' argument by noting that "the definition of
'enterprise' is quite broad"'l7 and "we see no sign of an intention
by Congress to exclude governmental units from its scope.'''lS
Moreover, Judge Kearse noted, RICO's substantive goals include
protection of governmental entities from corruption, as evi-
denced by the fact that bribery, obstruction of justice, and ob-
struction of law enforcement are included in the definitions of
"racketeering activity."'l9
The defendants argued, however, that if "enterprise" in-
cludes the New York City Civil Court, it would also include fed-
eral courts and agencies.so They could have added that it would
also include the Department of Justice or any subdivision
thereof, and even the Congress itself, or its staffs or subcommit-
tees. Indeed, it would seem to cover every association of people
for any purpose whatsoever.
Given the broad interpretation of racketeering activity in
73Id.
7< Id. at 30.
73 RICO § 1962(c) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enter-
prise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, intersUite or foreign com-
merce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such
enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of
unlawful debt.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976).
78 660 F.2d at 30-31.
n The court regarded as a definition of "enterprise" the following RICO section:
.. 'enterprise' includes any individual partnership, corporation, association, or other legal
entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not 11 legal
entity; ••• " 660 F.2d at 30 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1976».
78 660 F.2d at 31.
78 Id. at 32-33.
80 Id. at 34.
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Angelilli and other cases, if "enterprise" is thus broadly defined,
then virtually any dishonest participation in such an "enter-
prise" would be a RICO violation. If lawyers for parties in litiga-
tion write dishonest briefs, or a court writes a dishonest opinion,
that is arguably a violation of RICO, at least if it is done twice
within ten years.81
Judge Friendly dissented, noting that "no one would think
of describing a court as an 'enterprise' as a matter of ordinary
English speech," and that standard dictionaries define it as a
commercial or business firm.82
In United States v. Margiotta,83 the court was faced with
what it conceded was a "novel" interpretation of the mail fraud
statute8• and a matter "of first impression."sll The defendant,
who had been Republican Committee Chairman of both the
Town of Hempstead, New York, and Nassau County, New York,
was convicted of mail fraud and several counts of extortion.so
81 As United States v. Margiotta, see notes 83-122 and accompanying text infra,
makes clear, a public official owes a duty of honesty to the public and a breach of that
duty, if it involves the mails, is mail fraud. Thus, the judges and the prosecutors in my
example would seem clearly to be guilty of mail fraud. A dishonest lawyer who was not a
public official would present more difficult questions. Apart from that, it would seem
clear, under Angelilli, that these persons are potential racketeers. Since mail fraud is a
"racketeering activity" under RICO § 1961, 18 U.S.C. § 1262 (1976), and our hypotheti·
cal judges and lawyers are participating in the "affairs" of an "enterprise," all that is
necessary is a "pattern" of racketeering activity. The mailing of a brief or an opinion
would presumably constitute a violation of the mail fraud statute, but it might not be
enough to constitute a "pattern." Two briefs or two opinions, however, would assure
racketeer status. See generally Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling of the Prosecutor's
Nursery, 49 FORDHAM L. REv. 165, 210-13 (1980).
82 660 F.2d at 42. The majority in Angelilli found considerable support in the Su-
preme Court's decision in United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981), which held
that "enterprise" includes illegitimate as well as legitimate enterprises. The Court felt
that the statutory language was unambiguous on that issue and that the rule of lenity
was therefore inapplicable. Id. at 2531 n.10. In his Angelilli dissent, however, Judge
Friendly cogently argued that "[t]he problem here is totally different •.•. The issue in
Turkette was 'whether there was any justification for excluding from the term 'enter-
prise' an association that would normally be deemed to come within it. The question
here is whether there is any justification for expanding the term to include something
that would normally be deemed to fall outside it.''' 660 F.2d at 43.
as 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982).
.. Id. at 12l.
.8 Id. at 120. For a more in depth discussion of the Second Circuit's decision in
Margiotta, see Comment, Mail Fraud and the De Facto Public Official: The Second
Circuit Protects Citizens' Rights to Honest Government, 49 BROOKLYN L. REV. 933
(1983). .
88 688 F.2d at 118.
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The conviction was based on the facts that the defendant, in his
position as chairman, recommended a certain insurance broker
to be the town and county broker of record, in return for the
broker's agreement to distribute fifty percent of his insurance
commissions to various persons designated by the defendant.87
The designees were primarily other insurance brokers, but there
were some lawyers.ss Margiotta himself apparently shared in the
kickbacks.89 The defendant argued that this practice, which was
a longstanding method of distributing political patronage, was
not in violation of New York law, defrauded nobody, and, in any
event, was not a violation of the mail fraud statute.DO The court,
through Judge Kaufman, briefly bowed to the rule that ambigu-
ous penal laws "are to be construed strictly against the Govem-
ment,"91 but never returned to the subject. Instead, the court
spent eleven pages92 explaining why the mail fraud statut.e, more
than a century old,9s could fairly be applied for the first time to
the conduct before the court.9•
The court :first reviewed the case law from which it "dis_
tilled" the principle that "a public official may be prosecuted
under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 when his alleged scheme to defraud has
as its sole object the deprivation of intangible and abstract polit-
ical and civil rights of the general citzenry."9G A public official
may thus commit mail fraud even though he doesn't defraud
anyone in the usual sense; it is enough that he deprives his con-
stituents of their intangible right to "good government."DO Mar-
giotta apparently conceded that such was the law where a public
117 Id.
88 Id.
8lI ld. at 119.
"" 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976).
81 688 F.2d at 120.
81 Id. at 120-30. It should hardly have taken so much verbiage to explain that the
statute was unambiguous and, therefore, that the rule of lenity did not apply, but that
was implicit in the court's failure explicitly to square its decision with the rule.
83 18 U.S.C. § 1341 proscribes use of the mails, directly or indirectly, in the service
of "any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses••••n Id. It was enacted in 1872, in response to lottely
swindlers who used the mails in their schemes. 688 F.2d at 123. Judge Kaufman found
no legislative history indicating "that Congress • • • intended the mail fraud statute to
deal only with schemes to defraud involving money or property." Id.
... 688 F.2d at 123.
8. Id. at 121.
8lI Id. at 120.
HeinOnline -- 49 Brook. L. Rev.  926 1982-1983
926 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49: 911
official was concerned,97 but argued that since he was not a pub-
lic official, the principle the court "distilled" was simply not ap-
plicable to him.9S It had never been held, for example, that a
private citizen could commit mail fraud simply by doing some-
thing against the interest of "good government." Subjecting a
private individual to the law concerning ,public officials was the
"novel" question the court faced.
The court conceded that the mere fact that a person partici-
pates in government, e.g., by party activities, lobbying, speech-
making, creates no duty on his part to deal fairly or honestly in
his political activities;99 otherwise, all such participants would be
criminals. Judge Kaufman concluded, however, that where a pri-
vate individual "dominates" or has "de facto control" over a
governmental process, he owes the same fiduciary duty as a pub-
lic official. loO Since Margiotta, as party chairman, had a "stran-
glehold"lol on town and county government, he could not avoid
the fiduciary duties of a public official.lo2 Judge Kaufman found
no support in the legislative history of the mail fraud statute, or
even in prior decisions, for this extension of the law. Instead, he
quoted Holmes' aphorism that people "must turn square corners
when they deal with the Government,"103 to which he added that
it "requires little imaginative leap to conclude that individuals
who in reality are the government owe a fiduciary duty to the
citizenry."104
The next issue before the court was defining the fiduciary
.. Id. at 121.
.s Id. at 122.
.. Id. at 122-23.
100 Id. at 122, 127-28.
,., Id. at 122.
,.2 Id.
,.S Id. at 124 (quoting Rock Island, A. & L.R. Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143
(1920) (action against United States for refund of taxes; taxpayer had not exhausted
administrative remedies which were condition of suing government».
104 688 F.2d at 124. I am not sure what Judge Kaufman's implication - that if the
citizenry must deal honestly with the government, the government must deal honestly
with the citizenry - had to do with Margiotta, but it is an attractive idea, nonetheless.
Unfortunately, perhaps, it is not the law. Although citizens who lie to the government
commit crimes, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976) (false statement to government depart·
ment or agency), much of today's law enforcement activity consists of the perpetration of
elaborate frauds by the police on the citizenry, to test their honesty and/or to implicate
them in crime. See, e.g., United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1982). Is such law
enforcement activity mail fraud?
HeinOnline -- 49 Brook. L. Rev.  927 1982-1983
1983] CRIMINAL LAW COMMENTARY 927
duty and determining if it was breached. Margiotta argued that,
as chairman of a partisan political group, he had never pre-
tended to be other than partisan in his dealings with the town
and county.lOIS The court, however, said that the mail fraud pros-
ecution was not predicated on his partisanship, or any obligation
of imparitality.l08 Rather, he had a duty to disclose, to the t~wn
and county officials responsible for appointment of the broker of
record, whom he recommended to them, his secret arrangement
with the broker of record for the sharing of insurance commis-
sions.107 Since the obligation was owed not to these officials but
to the "citizenry,"108 it would seem that, under the court's ra-
tionale, disclosure to the appointing officials would not suffice.
If, for example, he had told them about the arrangement and
they were still willing to make the appointment - a matter of
high probability if, indeed, Margiotta had a "stranglehold" on
the system - he might be obliged to take out newspaper or tele-
vision ads announcing the arrangement.l09
The court, in rejecting Margiotta's claim that he had not
been given "fair warning" that his conduct violated the mail
fraud statute, noted that Margiotta had admitted at trial "that a
corrupt agreement [involving the kickbacks of insurance com-
missions] could be illegal."llo Thus, "the application of the mail
fraud statute to his artifice should come as no surprise. . . .
[A]lthough he may not have anticipated the precise legal theory
. . . Margiotta was given fair warning that his activities could
cause him to run afoul of the federal mail fraud statute.JIlIl
The meaning of these passages is not clear. Apparently,
105 688 F.2d at 127.
108 [d. This may have been correct, but much language in the opinion suggests that.
the prosecution could have been so predicated.
107 [d. at 127-28.
108 [d. at 122, 126. See also id. at 127 (suggesting duty to disclose secret. agreement.
"to the public").
1011 At least one of the officials, the Nassau County Executive, denied that. he had
been told of or was aware of the arrangement. for kicking back insurance premiums. [d.
at 143 (Winter, J., dissenting). If, however, the practice was widespread and of long-
standing, as was apparently conceded, id. at. 144, one may doubt. that. Margiotta. had to
tell any of the officials about it. in order for them to know of it. As Judge Winter ob-
served, the appointing official "surely • • • did not. think that. Margiotta's interest. in
naming the Broker of Record stemmed from intellectual curiosity about. the application'
of actuarial principles." [d. at 143.
110 [d. at 129.
m [d.
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however, the court was of the view that if one suspects that his
conduct, or something similar, may be illegal, his suspicion is a
substitute for fair notice. It is immaterial, as far as fair notice
principles are concerned, that the suspicions are based upon ig-
norance and would not have been held by one who was better
informed on the law. Moreover, if in fact the conduct is unlaw-
ful, e.g., under state law, it is immaterial, insofar as fair notice is
concerned, that one had no basis for believing that it was a fed-
eral crime.112
Judge Winter wrote a powerful dissenting opinion, cHarging
that the majority had converted mail fraud into "a catch-all pro-
hibition of political disingenou~ness [that] expands [the mail
fraud] legislation beyond any colorable claim of Congressional
intent...."113 The majority's rationale, he urged, applied to
candidates as well as public officers, and could subject them to a
federal prosecution for making a false campaign promise.u• He
also read the majority's decision as criminalizing the fact that a
partisan political leader supports a candidate for an appointive
post, partly as a reward for party services or party loyalty, with-
out disclosing that fact. lllI Similarly, a party leader who resists
modernization of political office in order to retain jobs for the
party faithful, without disclosing that motivation, has seemingly
committed mail fraud.116 Judge Winter concluded that the ma-
jority's opinion "finds not the slightest basis in Congressional in-
tent, statutory language or common canons of statutory
interpretation."117
Judge Winter conceded that the majority's reading of prior
112 Although none of it was cited in Judge Kaufman's opinion, there is probably
some support for all these devices for evading anti-vagueness prohibitions and notice
requirements. See generally Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 539 (1948) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting opinion); United States v. Seregos, 655 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1981); W.
LAFAVE AND A. SCOTT, supra note 12, at 83-89. Judge Kaufman also invoked another
notion, that a statute is not impermissibly vague if it requires willfulness or scienter. 688
F.2d at 129. This doctrine has Supreme Court support. See, e.g., Boyce Motor Lines, Inc.
v. United States, 342 U.S. 337 (1952). It is, however, absurd, as demonstrated in Justice
Jackson's dissent in Boyce, 342 U.S. at 345, and the unanswerable dissent of Justice
Roberts in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 151 (1945).
113 688 F.2d at 139. The court also upheld Margiotta's convictions for violating the
Hobbs Act. Judge Winter concurred in that result.
114 ld. at 140.
110 ld.
U8 ld.
117 ld. at 142.
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cases involving the fiduciary obligations of public officials was
far from outrageous.U8 Indeed, he agreed that there is "substan-
tial and direct precedent" for "much of what they say."uo To
hold that one has a "fiduciary obligation," without more defini-
tion and application to concrete situations, however, is to leave
juries "free to apply a legal standard which amounts t-o little
more than the rhetoric of sixth grade civics classes.U12o "One
searches in vain," he added, " for even the vaguest contours of
the legal obligations cr~ated beyond the obligation to conduct
governmental affairs 'honestly' or 'impartially,' to ensure one's
'honest and faithful' participation in government.U121
Judge Winter added:
I shudder at the prospect of partisan political activists being indicted
for failing to act 'impartially' in influencing governmental acts. Where
a statute, particularly a criminal statute, does not regulate specific be-
havior, enforcement of inchoate obligations should be by political
rather than criminal sanctions. Where Congress has not pnssed legis-
lation specifying particular acts by the politically active as criminal,
our reliance rather should be on public debate, a free press, and an
alert electorate.122
Judge Winter applied the rule of lenity.
CONCLUSION
In Newman, Angelilli, and Margiotta, the defendants had
all engaged in conduct that was unlawful, or arguably so, under
state laws. In the latter two cases, and arguably in Newman as
well, however, there was no strong federal interest involved. In
any event, there was no basis in any of these cases for conclud-
ing that the Congress ha4 ever identified a federal interest in the
conduct and had decided to invoke the federal criminal law to
protect that interest.
In -Newman, what precedent there was suggested that the
conduct was not covered by the federal securities law; in
Angelilli, there was little precedent either way; in Margiotta,
111 ld. at 141.
118 ld.
lSO ld. at 142.
lSI ld. at 142-43.
1.. ld. at 143. There are many other reasons to shudder over the implications of
Margiotta; indeed, enough to warrant a full-fledged fit. See note 81 supra.
HeinOnline -- 49 Brook. L. Rev.  930 1982-1983
930 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49: 911
there was absolutely none on the precise point that was "novel."
In all three cases, however, the Second Circuit held that the con-
duct was proscribed by federal criminal laws.
In all three cases, one can argue, as the court did, that the
conduct clearly proscribed by the statute is analogous to the
conduct in. issue.123 An omniscient Congress might well have
chosen to criminalize the conduct had it considered the specific
situations when it legislated. But the legislation in Newman was
half a century old and that in Margiotta more than a century.
Should a court undertake to "modernize" or bring "up to date"
legislation that could not possibly have envisioned the myriad
forms in which modern venality might manifest itself? The ma-
jorities in Newman and Margiotta obviously thought so, and
saw nothing illegitimate in undertaking such a modernization.124
The majority in Angelilli undertook to modernize RICO in ad-
vance, by interpreting it to cover everything.
There is much to be said for this "common law" approach
to non-penal statutes.125 Ironically, however, the Supreme Court
in recent years has been taking a "literalist" approach to statu-
tory interpretation in the non-penal context, reading into the
statute no more than its words require.12s There is something
very disturbing about a society in which judges make criminal
law by the "common law method" but require legislatures to be
explicit when enacting non-criminal legislation. Is criminal law
not important enough to command the attention of Congress?
Is it not important enough to require that the democratically
elected arm of government make the decisions about what con-
duct shall be criminal and what shall not? Do courts and prose-
cutors have expertise that the Congress lacks in such matters?
... An interesting irony is that the prosecutor in Margiotta supported the conviction
by comparisons with the Soviet Union, apparently suggesting that Margiotta's conduct
was somehow akin to the Soviet system, which is "alien to our country." 688 F.2d at 144
n.7. The conviction was sustained, however, by adopting something akin to "punishment
by analogy," which was once common in Russia but is "not compatible with our constitu-
tional system." Papacristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 168-69 (1972). Even the
Soviet Union ultimately abolished crime by analogy, as incompatible with justice. See
Grzybowski, Soviet Criminal Law Reform of 1958, 35 IND. L.J. 125, 129 (1960).
12. On judicially filling statutory "loopholes," see J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF
CRIMINAL LAW 50-52 (2d ed 1960).
12. See generally G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
120 See Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpre·
tation in the Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 892, 894 (1982).
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One can plausibly argue the affirmative on all of these pro-
positions, if criminal punishment is viewed simply as a means of
regulation. The administrative model has much to commend it-
self in criminal law, if our priority is efficiency.127 But why
bother with law at all? Why not just enact a general authoriza-
tion to convict as criminals anyone whose behavior is seriously
antisocial, and let prosecutors and jurors decide that question?
The reason, of course, is that the power to criminalize is the
power to destroy, as Judge Winter ominously reminded us in his
Margiotta dissent.128 Moreover, the quintessential purpose of
criminal law is to ceremonialize and to solidify the core values of
society. It loses its moral force, and hence undermines its pri-
mary purpose, when those values are not democratically deter-
mined. There is little reason to respect judge-made criminal law
and no per se basis to condemn those who are caught up in it.
107 For an effort to show that the administrative model has taken over part of our
criminal law, see Duke, Prosecutions for Attempts to Evade Income Tax: A Discordant
View of a Procedural Hybrid, 76 YALE L.J. 1 (1967).
12$ 688 F.2d at 143 (Winter, J., dissenting).
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